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IN' THE SUPREME U,,w
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 900375
Priority No. 2

FREDERICK JOSEPH GERMONTO
Defendant/Appellant.

REP

OMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
The jurisdictional statement, issues presented for
review, statement of the case, and facts have all been previously
presented.

(LDA Br. at 1-6; Supp. Br. at 1-3) .x

After the State

filed its response brief, this Court granted appellant additional
time to address in his reply brief an issue which had been
previously raised in a different context.

The Court has also

granted the State time to respond on this issue in its new
context.

Therefore, appellant presents this brief in reply to

some of the issues raised by the State in its response and to
address the first issue concerning jury unanimity in the context
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
1

Four prior briefs have been filed in this case. Salt Lake
Legal Defenders filed an opening brief which will be referred to
as LDA Br., defendant filed a pro se brief which will be referred
to as Pro Se Br., alternative counsel, appointed after LDA's
withdrawal, filed a supplemental opening brief which will be
referred to as Supp. Br., and the State has filed a response to
all of the briefs which will be referred to as State Br.
1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES
Any constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules
relevant to the disposition of this appeal are set forth in the
text or addenda of this brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE HOMICIDE VERDICT VIOLATED MR. GERMONTO'S
RIGHT TO A UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICT. MR. GERMONTO'S
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT RAISING THE ISSUE.
In its opening brief, Salt Lake Legal Defender
Association (LDA) raised an issue concerning the nonunanimous
nature of the jury verdict in this case.

The trial court

instructed the jury on all four possible variants of second
degree murder, i.e. a knowing and intentional homicide, or a
homicide committed as a result of the actor's intent to cause
serious bodily injury to another, or depraved indifference
homicide, or a homicide committed during the commission of an
enumerated felony.

The trial court did not instruct the jury

that it must be unanimous on which variant of second degree
murder it found.

While this issue has been settled with respect

to the first three variants of second degree murder by prior case
law from this Court, the issue presented in this case, whether
all four variants of second degree murder can be presented to a
jury without a concomitant unanimity instruction is an issue of
first impression.
Mr. Germonto's trial attorneys did not object to the lack of
a unanimity instruction nor did they propose that a unanimity
2

instruction be given.

When LDA raised the issue in its brief it

did not specifically allege either plain error or ineffective
assistance of counsel.

Rather the LDA brief relied on an

apparent exception to the plain error rule which had been
enunciated by this Court in State v. Breckenridae, 688 P.2d 440,
443 (Utah 1983) and State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 802-03 (Utah
1990).

In Jameson, 800 P.2d at 802-03, this Court stated it was

"obliged to consider [an issue] based on a constitutional
question and [where] defendant's liberty is at stake."
proposition originated in State
443 (Utah 1983) .

This

v. Breckenridae, 688 P.2d 440,

Current counsel, alternate counsel appointed

after LDA's withdrawal, did not withdraw either of the preceding
briefs and allowed them to stand as written, believing that the
issue raised by LDA concerning jury unanimity was based on
sufficient reasonable grounds articulated in Breckenridae and
Jameson.
In its response brief, the State argues that according
to a recent case issued by this Court, this Court is now
prohibited from considering the jury unanimity claim because it
was not properly preserved in the trial court and not properly
raised on appeal.

The case relied on by the State is State v.

Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 1992), in which this Court
stated that the Breckenridae language "has resulted in some
confusion regarding the waiver/procedural default rule. . . .
do not intend in Breckenridae to carve out an additional
exception to our traditional plain error standard, and we now
3

We

expressly disavow any implications to that affect."
Adv. Rep. at 5.

201 Utah

The State argues that Brown applies directly to

the issue raised by LDA and because it was not raised in another
context, the issue should not be considered by this Court.
However, by its order this Court has allowed the sides to address
the issue in other contexts.
Furthermore, Mr. Germonto contends that Brown does not
foreclose consideration of an issue raised in such a manner as
was raised by the LDA brief.

Rather, Brown, merely states that

rather than considering such an issue under a constitutional
standard, such issues would be reviewed "using the plain error
standard."

Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5.

Mr. Germonto asserts

that when this standard is applied, the trial court committed
plain error.

While the LDA brief did not use the words "plain

error" or "manifest injustice," an examination of LDA's brief
arguably shows that the plain error standard was met in this
case.
Additionally, Mr. Germonto now asserts that his trial
counsel was ineffective for allowing the jury to be instructed on
all four variants of second degree murder without a concomitant
unanimity instruction.

Under either a plain error standard or an

ineffective assistance standard, Mr. Germonto was prejudiced by
the failure of the trial court to require a unanimous jury
verdict.2

To demonstrate a claim of ineffective assistance of

2

"Plain error" is a recognized exception to the general rule
that errors must ordinarily be preserved in the trial court. Utah
R. Evid. 103(b).
To substantiate a finding of plain error, the
4

counsel, the defendant must demonstrate deficient performance
which resulted in prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984); State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990).
The Strickland court stated that deficient performance occurs
when counsel has "made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment."

466 U.S. at 87.

Prejudice requires a showing

that counsel's errors were "so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."
486 U.S. at 687.
At the time of the trial in this case, the case law on jury
unanimity was well established in this state.

Several cases had

addressed the issue of unanimity with respect to jury verdicts in
second degree homicide cases.

Counsel should have been aware of

those cases and also should have known that none of the cases
addressed the issue raised by this case; i.e. whether a jury
could have been instructed on all four variants of second degree
homicide without a specific unanimity instruction.

Counsel's

failure to raise the issue via either an objection to the
instruction or by offering an additional instruction constituted
deficient performance.
appellate court must find from a review of the record that it
should have been obvious to the trial court that it was committing
error and that the error was harmful in that it affected the
substantial rights of the defendant. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. at
5.
In this case the plain error standard and the ineffective
assistance standard are quite similar. The LDA brief covers the
inherent error and the resultant prejudice. Therefore, the analysis
in this brief deals only with ineffective assistance of counsel but
much of it also applies to the plain error standard of review.
5

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990) is the second degree
homicide statute that was in effect at the time of the trial in
this case.

That statute states:

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the
second degree if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death
of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to
another he commits an act clearly dangerous to
human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a
depraved indifference for human life, he engages
in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
another and thereby causes the death of another;
(d) while in the commission, attempted
commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of aggravated
robbery, robbery, . . . burglary, . . . causes
the death of another person other than a party as
defined in §76-2-202.
In State v. Standiford, 759 P.2d 254, 259

(Utah 1 9 8 8 ) ,

this Court held that the first three variants of second degree
murder were logically equivalent.
Russell. 733 P.2d 162

Previously, in State v.

(Utah 1987), the Court held that a jury

need not be unanimous in deciding which of the first three
variants of second degree murder is applicable in any particular
case because the variants are virtually equivalent.

In a

concurring opinion, Justice Stewart indicated his concern that
the lead opinion might be applied to crimes other than second
degree murder.

Justice Stewart concluded that "because their

mental states are so highly similar, from the point of view of
mental functioning and culpability, I think the jury was, for
essential constitutional purposes, unanimous on the mens rea
element."

733 P.2d at 170.

After an extensive analysis of the

6

Utah provisions and comparison with the Model Penal Code, Justice
Stewart stated that he concurred with the lead opinion's result
because:
Despite these departures from the Model Penal
Code, it is clear from Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145
P.2d 1003, and the MPC Commentary that all mental
states in §76-5-203 (1) (a)# (b), (c) are
essentially forms of common law malice
aforethought. Each is at least "an intention or
design previously formed to do an act or admit to
an act, knowing that the reasonable and natural
consequences thereof would be likely to cause
death or great bodily injury." Russell, 106 Utah
at 126, 145 P.2d at 1007.
Not only is each mental state in the Utah
statute a form of common law malice aforethought
but each one also amounts to a varied form of
depraved indifference murder. Certainly, intentionally causing death demonstrates depraved
indifference for the value of the life taken. . . .
Therefore, a juror who finds that a defendant who
intentionally or knowingly committed a homicide
must necessarily find depraved indifference
because the defendant who intends to kill is
aware that his conduct creates a grave risk of
death.
A person who intends to cause serious bodily
injury while doing an act "clearly dangerous" to
human life, also acts with a depraved indifference to the value of human life. Serious bodily
injury is defined as "bodily injury that creates
and causes serious prominent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any
bodily member or organ or creates a substantial
risk of death." Section 76-1-601(9). A person
whose "conscious objective or desire" is to cause
that type of injury while committing an act
clearly dangerous to human life, §76-2-103(1),
also demonstrates depraved indifference. The
objective depraved indifference judgment is made
out when the nature of injuries the defendant
intends to cause is "serious," as opposed to
"slight." . . .
It follows that regardless of which
mental state individual jurors relied upon in
reaching this verdict, all agree that the
7

defendant knowingly engaged in conduct that
created a grave risk of death of the victim
and that he acted under circumstances that
evidenced a depraved indifference to human
life.
733 P.2d at 173-74.
Justice Stewart's opinion in Russell formed the basis
for the decision in Standiford and is reflected in the lengthy
discussion of depraved indifference contained in Standiford.
According to the Standiford analysis, the depraved indifference
variation of second degree murder is necessarily included in
variations (a) and (b) of second degree murder.

769 P.2d at 259.

Even if variations (a) and (b) are absent, the depraved
indifference variation may still be present.

This is so because

the three variations form a continuum of mental states.

Depraved

indifference is more than the recklessness required for
manslaughter but less than the intentional killing defined in
variation (a) of the second degree murder statute.
769 P.2d at 261-64.

Standiford,

Depraved indifference is the least common

denominator for the first three variants of second degree murder.
However, any time either of the first two variations is present,
the depraved indifference variation will also be present, because
all three variations evidence at least depraved indifference.
Therefore, the Russell Court was able to hold that a jury does
not have to be unanimous in deciding which of the first three
possible mental states is present in convicting of second degree
murder because the three mental states are so closely related as

8

to be a variant of the same culpable mental state.

733 P.2d at

167.
However, the fourth variant of second degree murder,
often referred to as the "felony murder rule," does not share the
commonalty of mens rea with the first three variants.

In fact,

the Court has stated that the fourth variant of second degree
murder requires no mens rea.

State v. McCovev, 803 P.2d 1234,

1239 (Utah 1990); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah 1989).
Rather, the Court has held that variant (d) makes an
unintentional killing committed during the course of an
enumerated felony a second degree murder.

£d.

In McCovey the

Court stated the rationale for not requiring an intent to kill
under the felony-murder rule:
The traditional common law purpose of
the felony murder doctrine has been to allow
the State to obtain a second degree murder
conviction without proving any form of mens
rea, or mental state. The felony murder
statute automatically enhances the degree of
the offense and punishment without the
necessity of considering a mens rea or mental
state, i.e. whether the felon intended to
commit murder. In essence, it is a strict
liability offense that enhances an otherwise
unintentional killing to second degree
murder.
A further purpose of the felony murder
statute is to deter the use of force or
weapons in the commission of a felony. If a
felon knows that a homicide committed during
the commission of a felony, whether
accidental or unintentional, will be treated
as a first degree felony in addition to the
underlying felony being committed, he or she
will be less apt to use deadly force or
dangerous weapons.
803 P.2d at 1238-39.

See also Standiford, 769 P.2d at 259.
9

In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 577-80, 585-88 (Utah
1988), a majority of this Court held that the Utah Constitution
required that the jury be unanimous as to every element of a
crime and that the term "element" includes both conduct and the
culpable mental state.

See also Standiford, 769 P.2d at 250.

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution requires the same.

In Re Winship, 397 U.S.

358 (1970) .
In Russell and Standiford, the Court determined that because
the first three variants of second degree homicide encompass
virtually the same mental state, a jury can be unanimous even
though individual jurors may decide that a different variant of
the statute are involved.
is involved.

All jurors agree that a mental element

However, when the fourth variant of second degree

murder is added to the set of variants which the jury may
consider, some of the jurors may find that no mental element is
involved while others may find that the homicide was committed
under some mental element.

In effect, instructing on all four

variants of second degree murder allows a jury to be nonunanimous
with respect to the mental element involved in the crime.

Some

jurors will find a mental element while others need not find such
an element to return a verdict of guilt.

Such a variation

clearly violates Tillman.
In State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
the court of appeals held that counsel's failure to request a
proper instruction on defense of habitation was deficient
10

performance.

The court speculated that counsel's failure "to

check the 'pocket-part' of the Utah Code" resulted in the
deficient performance.

771 P.2d at 692.

The court could

conceive of no tactical basis for counsel's omission.
In this case all the cases previously cited had been issued
by this Court prior to the trial in this case except McCovey.3
Therefore, counsel and the trial court should have been aware of
the case law and of the problems of a nonunanimous jury verdict
i

and of the potential for a nonunanimous jury verdict because of
the jury instruction which included all four alternatives of
second degree murder without requiring the jury to be unanimous
on either the first three variants or the fourth variant.
Nothing was to be gained by allowing the jury to be nonunanimous
therefore, the decision could not have been a tactical decision
of counsel.

Rather, counsel's actions can only be viewed as

deficient performance.
The prejudice inherent in a nonunanimous jury verdict
was discussed by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion
Tillman.

Justice Stewart stated:
The importance of preserving the principle
of jury unanimity as to all "elements of an
offense" can hardly be overstated. To dilute
that principle by allowing jurors to disagree
among themselves as to separate, alternative elements of the crime, even though they agree on the
general conclusion that the crime . . . has been
committed, is to lose the value of the
synergistic affect of jurors acting as a group

3

The proposition for which this brief cites McCovey was wellknown from other cases at the time of trial. See e.g. , Standiford,
769 P.2d at 259.
11

and reconstructing facts and applying the law.
Nonunanimity permits a jury to refrain from coming to grips with determining precisely what the
defendant did and then deciding whethei: that met
the legal standards for defining the legal elements of the crime.
Nonunanimity as to alternative elements of a
crime can also deprive the defendant of a defense
to the charge. . . .
. . . Finally, if the principal of jury unanimity is relaxed, all the vaunted projections of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt will be threatened. Requiring juror unanimity as to the crime
itself only, rather than each element of the
crime, would permit a jury to render inconsistent
and potentially irrational verdicts because they
may be based on conflicting and even inconsistent
determinations of the facts. That is no small
erosion of a fundamental principal of our criminal justice system.
750 P.2d at 578.

As related by Justice Stewart, the prejudice

inherent in counsel's deficient performance in failing to require
a unanimous verdict as to the variant of second degree homicide
deprived Mr. Germonto of the fair trial guaranteed him by the
Utah and U. S. Constitutions.
Counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Mr. Germonto and
this Court should reverse his conviction.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT PERMITTED THE CHARGES TO BE JOINED
BECAUSE THE CHARGES DID NOT ARISE OUT OF A
SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE,
In its opening brief, LDA noted that over the objection
of defense counsel, the trial court allowed the prosecution to
join in a single information the original forgery charge and the
subsequent homicide and robbery/burglary charges.
12

(LDA Br. at

14-18)

In response, the State argues that the joinder was proper

because the charges were part of a single criminal episode and
the evidence of the forgery was otherwise admissible under Rule
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, in that "it supported defendant's
identification in the homicide case."

(State Br. at 26-31)

Neither of the State's arguments is a valid reason for the
joinder.
Conduct is part of a "single criminal episode" if the
conduct "is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt
or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective."
Ann. §76-1-401 (1990) .

Utah Code

The statute requires both temporal

proximity and commonality of purpose for two or more crimes to
form a single criminal episode.
In this case, the forgery was accomplished fairly close in
time to the homicide and robbery.

However, the forgery was not a

part of a single criminal objective.

The State characterizes the

single criminal objective as the objective of the defendant "to
obtain 'things of value' from the victim." (State Br. at 28)
However, the State presents no evidence which indicates that the
defendant assaulted Mr. Lisonbee in order to obtain his check
book or to commit a forgery.

Rather, the only evidence presented

at trial indicated that the defendant's killing of Mr. Lisonbee
was in response to the latter's production of a dangerous weapon.
(Supp. Br. at 6-15)

The theft of items from Mr. Lisonbee's home

occurred only as an afterthought after the victim had been
rendered unconscious and probably dead.
13

(T. 4 at 146-50) No

evidence, not even any circumstantial evidence, indicated that
Mr. Germonto went to Mr. Lisonbee's house with the object of
taking "things of value" from him.
contrary are simply pure conjecture.

The State's assertions to the
The only inference

supported by the evidence is that the forgery was a separate and
distinct crime from any previous crimes committed by the
defendant.
The State also argues that evidence of forgery would
have been admissible at Mr. Germonto's homicide trial because Mr.
Germonto's "possession of the forged check only minutes after Mr.
Lisonbee's death supported defendant's identification as the
murderer, as well as his motive and intent in committing the
homicide."

(State Br. at 29)

However, the State overlooks the

fact that identification was not an issue in this case.
Germonto admitted that he hit Mr. Lisonbee.

Mr.

(T. 4 at 144-45) The

primary issue with respect to the homicide was whether it was
committed in self-defense.
Additionally, the State argues that joinder was proper
because the forgery provided proof of motive.

However, proof of

motive is not required to maintain a criminal conviction.
Therefore, contrary to the State's assertion, the evidence would
not have been admissible under Rule 4 04(b).
The forgery was used to stigmatize the defendant and
influence the jury's fair and dispassionate consideration of the
evidence.

"The effect of joinder was to permit the consideration

of prejudicial evidence pertaining to charges on which the
14

evidence would have been inadmissible in a separate trial."
State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 1986).

As such, the

trial court abused its discretion when it permitted the
information to be joined.
POINT III
THE DEFENSE OF HABITATION INSTRUCTION WAS
COMPLETELY INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE AND
DEPRIVED MR. GERMONTO OF A FAIR TRIAL.
In its opening brief, LDA asserted that the defense of
habitation instruction was erroneously given by the trial court.
The instruction was inapplicable in this case and was prejudicial
because the prosecutor misused it in seeking to meet the State's
burden of proof.

The effect was to lessen the burden of proof

required by the State.
In response, the State claims that the evidence
supported the trial court's giving of the defense habitation
instruction and that the defendant could not object to the
instruction on the ground that it diminished the prosecution's
burden of proof.

In support of its claim that the evidence

supports the instruction, the State makes several erroneous
assertions.

For example, the State claims that the defendant

"never feared fatal harm from Mr. Lisonbee."

(State Br. at 33)

However, the State ignores Mr. Germonto's testimony that he
feared for his life when he saw Mr. Lisonbee with a knife in his
hand.

(T. 4 at 194)

The State also claims that the evidence

supports "a reasonable inference that while Mr. Lisonbee may have
opened the door, defendant gained entry into the home by
15

assaulting Mr. Lisonbee." (State Br. 34)

However, the State can

point to no evidence which supports this "inference."

For

example, there is no evidence that Mr. Germonto entered the house
carrying any type of implement that could have been used as a
weapon, for example, a wrench.
Lost in its own maze of twisted inferences, the State fails
to address the real issue, i.e. that the defense of habitation
instruction given by the trial court pertains only to a statutory
defense.

The statute which gave rise to the instruction is found

in a part of the Utah Code which is entitled "Justification
Excluding Criminal Responsibility."
Chapter 2 Part 4 (1990).
justified [as] a
§76-2-401 (1990).

Utah Code Ann. Title 76

The part concerns "conduct which is

defense to prosecution . . . ."

Utah Code Ann.

(Addendum A) The defense of habitation

instruction was a non sequitur in this case.

By giving the

instruction, the trial court turned the entire concept of the
statute on its head.
Additionally, even if the instruction was somehow
appropriate, certain prerequisites must be met before such an
instruction may be given.

In In re R.J.Z., 736 P.2d 235, 236-37

(Utah 1987), this Court enumerated the requirements to be met
before the defense of habitation statute may be invoked:
In order to avail himself of the
justification provided by Section 76-2405(1), the defendant must have had a
reasonable belief that the force was
necessary. We interpret the term
"reasonable" to mean objectively reasonable.
In order to be justified in using deadly
force, certain other requirements must be
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met. If the entry is a violent or
surreptitious one, the defendant must have
had a reasonable belief that the entry was
made for the purpose of committing a violent
act. Further, the defendant must reasonably
believe that the force used was necessary to
prevent the violence. The defendant would
also be justified in using deadly force if he
had a reasonable belief that the entry was
for the purpose of committing a felony and
that the force used was necessary to prevent
the felony from being committed.
In 1985, the legislature amended section
76-2-4 05 to add the language now found in
section 76-2-405(2). . . . After considering
the language and the legislative history of
this amendment, we are persuaded that the
legislature intended that a legal presumption
of reasonableness would arise whenever an
entry is "unlawful" and "made or attempted by
use of force, or in a violent and tumultuous
manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or
for the purpose of committing a felony."
The trial judge refused to make a
finding as to whether the entry in this case
was unlawful and forcible. We hold that such
a finding is essential to the proper
application of section 76-2-405. The first
step in deciding whether any defendant is
justified under section 76-2-405 is to
determine what burden of proof the defendant
and the State are respectively required to
carry. It is impossible to allocate the
burden of proof without first determining
whether the defendant is entitled to the
statutory presumption.
The instruction given in this case allowed the jury to
"infer" that Mr. Lisonbee acted reasonably.

(R. 267)

this

"presumption" of reasonableness is beneficial to the party
receiving it inasmuch as it shifts the burden of proof to the
other party.

Moritzsky, 771 P.2d at 691.

When given in its

normal context, the effect is to shift the burden to the State.
However, in this case the effect was to impermissably shift the
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burden to Mr. Germonto.

When combined with the prosecutor's

argument (LDA Br. at 19-21), the instruction allowed the jury to
presume that Mr. Germonto's self-defense claim was legally
unavailable and that the burden of proof necessarily shifted to
the defendant.
Furthermore, no evidence supported a finding that Mr.
Lisonbee had a reasonable belief that force was necessary.

No

evidence supported a finding that Mr. Germonto's entry into Mr.
Lisonbee's house was other than invited.

No evidence supported a

finding that Mr. Lisonbee's use of force was necessary to prevent
violence.

No evidence supported a finding that Mr. Germonto's

entry was for the purpose of committing a felony.

Finally, no

finding was made by the trial judge that the entry was unlawful
and forcible as required by R.J.Z.

In short, even if the giving

of the instruction was appropriate, the necessary prerequisites
required by R.J.Z. were not met.
The trial court's use of the defense of habitation
instruction was not justified by the statute, was not supported
by the evidence, did not comport with R.J.Z., and impermissably
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.
POINT IV
THE ROBBERY CHARGE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED
BY THE TRIAL COURT BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE ROBBERY
WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY MEANS OF FORCE OR FEAR.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE ROBBERY CONVICTION WAS
NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
In his supplemental brief, Mr. Germonto asserted that
the robbery charge was unsupported by the evidence and, as a
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matter of law, should have been dismissed because the prosecution
failed to establish all of the required elements that demonstrate
that a robbery occurred.
The State responds by claiming that the defendant has
not marshaled the evidence to support his contention, that the
evidence did support the robbery conviction and that "under the
res gestae rule, it is inconsequential that the death of the
victim preceded the [robbery]."

(State Br. at 36-42)

The State's contention that the evidence has not been
marshaled is simply untrue.

Pages 8 through 11 of the

defendant's supplemental brief clearly details the evidence
concerning the robbery.
The "evidence" which the State claims supports the
conviction does not include two crucial pieces of evidence.
First, the State ignores Mr. Germonto's testimony that before any
items were taken, Mr. Lisonbee was at least unconscious and
probably dead.

Also ignored is the medical examiner's testimony

that Mr. Lisonbee could have lived for only a period of one to
perhaps as much as fifteen minutes after the blows were
inflicted.

(T. 3 at 33)

The State can point to no evidence

I
other than its own conjecture and speculation that Mr. Germonto
formed an intent to take property from Mr. Lisonbee before Mr.
Lisonbee died.

Indeed, the evidence supports Mr. Germonto's

version of events, i.e. that Mr. Lisonbee confronted Mr. Germonto
with a knife and pushed Mr. Germonto while cutting his hand.

Mr.

Germonto, fearing for his life, began to hit Mr. Lisonbee with
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the wrench that was in his hand.

Regardless of whether Mr.

Germonto intended to kill Mr. Lisonbee or acted in self-defense,
it is clear that at the time Mr. Lisonbee was bludgeoned, no
evidence supports the inference that Mr. Germonto intended to
take anything from Mr. Lisonbee.

Only after Mr. Lisonbee lay

unconscious did Mr. Germonto form the intent to take some of Mr.
Lisonbee's property in order to facilitate his escape from Salt
Lake City.

(T. 4 at 151)

No evidence presented by the

prosecution contradicts this theory of the case.

Indeed, the

prosecution argued this theory of the case to the jury in closing
arguments when the prosecutor stated that Mr. Germonto should be
found guilty of the robbery because "he robbed Mr. Lisonbee after
he killed him."

(T. 5 at 46)

The question which the State avoids and which this Court
must address is whether the robbery statute which requires an
unlawful or intentional taking of personal property in the
possession of another "from his person or immediate presence,
against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear" can be
accomplished when the victim is unconscious or dead and the
defendant inflicted the wound which caused the victim's injuries
without an intent to take the victim's personal property.

The

cases cited in the appellant's supplemental brief clearly
demonstrate that if a murder is committed with no intent to
commit a robbery, no robbery has occurred. "If a theft is
conceived of, and executed after a murder, it is a theft but it
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is not an armed robbery."

State v. Lopez, 762 P.2d 545, 551

(Ariz. 1988).
Furthermore, as argued in the appellant's supplemental
brief, if this Court finds, as other courts have, that Mr.
Germonto's robbery conviction was not supported by sufficient
evidence, because the taking was not executed by means of force
or fear, then Mr. Germonto's murder conviction must also fail.
(Supp. Br. at 15-16)

If some jurors predicated their finding of

guilt on the felony murder rule and the underlying felony is not
supported by the evidence, then the homicide conviction also
lacks evidentiary support.
Under this set of circumstances, Mr. Germonto may have
committed a murder and a theft, but not a robbery.

However,

theft is not one of the enumerated felonies in §76-5-203(d) which
will support a conviction for murder in the second degree under
the felony-murder rule.

Therefore, as argued in Point I above,

because some of the jurors could have found that the murder was
committed under variant (d) of the second degree murder statute,
the murder conviction must fail because of the prospect that the
jury was not unanimous on all of the elements which constituted
the offense of second degree murder.
POINT V
THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT VIOLATED MR. GERMONTO'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND EITHER PLAIN ERROR WAS
COMMITTED OR COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT
CURTAILING THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT.
In both the LDA opening brief and appellant's supplemental brief, arguments were advanced that the prosecutor engaged in
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prejudicial misconduct when he questioned Mr. Germonto concerning
when the defendant disclosed the version of events which he
related during his testimony.

Additional error was committed

when the prosecutor argued to the jury that Mr. Germonto should
not be believed because he had not disclosed the version which
was the subject of his testimony to his own attorney until
shortly before trial.

Because the prosecutor's questioning and

argument were not objected to at trial, the issue was raised in
the context of both plain error and ineffective assistance of
counsel.

(LDA Br. at 22-27; Supp. Br. at 16-25)
The State responds to the argument by claiming that no

attorney-client privilege existed which could haive been
infringed by the prosecutor; that even if the content of the letter were privileged, the defendant waived the privilege by
answering the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination; that
the prosecutor's comments did not invade the defendant's right to
remain silent; and that the defendant was not prejudiced by the
prosecutor's conduct.
Communications subject to the attorney-client privilege
are those which promote the best possible representation of the
client and encourage candor between the attorney and the client.
Gold Standard v. American Barrick Resources, 801 P.2d 909, 911
(Utah 1990) .

Furthermore, each case must be considered individu-

ally to determine whether the communication in question can properly be considered confidential under the privilege.

Id.

threshold inquiry to determine whether a communication is
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The

confidential is whether the communication was intended by the
client to be confidential.

Hofmann v. Condor, 712 P.2d 216, 217

(Utah 19€5) (Zimmerman, J., dissenting) citing McCormick on
Evidence §91, at 217 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
In this case, Mr. Germonto's letter was initially delivered
to the trial judge.

However, the trial judge did not read the

letter and immediately passed it to defense counsel.
10)

(M. 5 at

Defense counsel stated that the letter "totally, and

completely changes our defense."

(R. 313 at 3-4). Mr.

Germonto's answer to the prosecutor's question at trial indicates
that the letter was indeed directed to his attorney and was only
passed to the judge to facilitate delivery to the attorney.
4 at 226)

(T.

Furthermore, the answer indicates Mr. Germonto's

desire to communicate candidly with his attorney.

Clearly, the

letter was a candid communication from Mr. Germonto and was
designed to promote the best possible representation of him by
his attorneys.

Therefore, the letter was clearly a confidential

communication subject to the attorney-client privilege.
The State claims that even if the communication was subject to the attorney-client privilege the confidentiality was
waived when the following exchange occurred between the
prosecutor and Mr. Germonto during trial:
Q. When did you first tell anybody about this,
"he-attacked-me-with-a-knife" part of the story?
A. The first time that I told the truth about
what has happened was right after my meditation
that the Lord told me that, "the truth is the
only way. The truth is the only thing that is
going to save you from that. The truth is the
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only thing that you can do now." And so, I wrote
my attorney, which was directed to the judge, a
letter explaining all of the things thatt I said
here today.
(T. 4 at 226)
Rather than volunteer information which would waive the
attorney-client privilege, Mr. Germonto's answer was a direct
response to the prosecutor's prejudicial question which was
gleaned only because the prosecutor possessed knowledge of the
existence of the confidential letter.

Indeed, if the prosecutor

did not have knowledge of the confidential letter, he would have
been unable to ask the question.

The prosecutor did not know

before the existence of the letter what Mr. Germonto7s defense
would be to the charges, i.e. whether Mr. Germonto would admit to
killing Mr. Lisonbee in self-defense or whether he would deny any
participation in the crime.

The prosecutor took advantage of his

knowledge of the existence of the confidential letter to ask Mr.
Germonto questions which impinged on Mr. Germonto's
attorney-client privilege and his right to remain silent.

A

properly interposed objection by defense counsel or questioning
of the prosecutor's motivation in asking the question by the
trial court would have prevented the prosecutor from ascertaining
any information from Mr. Germonto.
Counsel's error in not objecting to the question clearly
cannot be termed a tactical decision because nothing could have
been gained by Mr. Germonto's answer which plainly affected his
credibility.

Rather, the failure to object was an oversight

which was deficient performance.
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The State claims that Mr.

Germonto could not have been prejudiced by either the error by
the trial court or the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel
because as the State claims, Mr. Germonto's "credibility was not
central to the case . . . ."

(State Br. at 51)

The State's

argument incorrectly discounts the reality that Mr. Germonto's
credibility was at issue.

If the jury believed Mr. Germonto's

version of the events, then it would have found that Mr. Germonto
acted in self-defense and that he had not committed a murder.
The prosecutor's questions and comments in closing argument
infringed on Mr. Germonto's attorney-client privilege and his
right to remain silent.

The trial court's and defense counsel's

inaction prejudiced Mr. Germonto's case.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above and in the preceding briefs
filed on behalf of Appellant, Mr. Germonto's conviction should be
reversed and remanded for a new trial or dismissal.
Respectfully submitted this fu

day of March, 1993.

NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

c
CURTIS C. NESSET
Attorney for Appellant
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26

day of March, 1993.

ADDENDUM A

PART 4
JUSTIFICATION EXCLUDING CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
76-2-401. Justification as defense — When allowed.
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution for any offense based
on the conduct. The defense of justification may be claimed:
(1) When the actor's conduct is in defense of persons or property under
the circumstances described in Sections 76-2-402 through 76-2-406 of this
part;
(2) When the actor's conduct is reasonable and in fulfillment of his
duties as a governmental officer or employee;
(3) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of minors by parents, guardians, teachers, or other persons in loco parentis;
(4) When the actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of persons in custody under the laws of the state;
(5) When the actor's conduct is justified for any other reason under the
laws of this state.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-401, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-401.

76-2-405. Force in defense of habitation,
(1) A person is justified in using force against another when and to the
extent that he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or
terminate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation; however, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury only if:
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a violent and tumultuous manner, surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he reasonably believes that the
entry is attempted or made for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to any person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and he
reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent the assault or
offer of personal violence; or
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is made or attempted for the
purpose of committing a felony in the habitation and that the force is
necessary to prevent the commission of the felony.
(2) The person using force or deadly force in defense of habitation is presumed for the purpose of both civil and criminal cases to have acted reasonably and had a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily
injury if the entry or attempted entry is unlawful and is made or attempted by
use of force, or in a violent and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by
stealth, or for the purpose of committing a felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-405, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-405; 1985, ch. 252, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amendroent designated the first paragraph as Subsection (1); redesignated former Subsections (1)
and (2) as Subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b); inserted surreptitiously, or by stealth in Sub-

section (l)(a); substituted "in the habitation"
for "therein" in Subsection (l)(a); inserted "he
reasonably believes" in Subsection (l)(a); substituted "in the habitation" for "therein" in
Subsection (l)(b); added Subsection (2); and
m a d e m i n o r c h a n g e s i n phraseology,

